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Abstract — The objective of this paper is to raise a challenge 
to Ilhan Inan’s claim (2013) that an agent’s curiosity ceases when 
the agent is firmly certain about the object of curiosity that is of 
interest to him, and to supplement his account by appealing to an 
aspect of curiosity that Inan overlooks substantively: open-
mindedness.  To achieve this objective, I first provide a brief 
summary of Inan’s claim that an agent’s curiosity is directly 
proportional to his interest and uncertainty, and inversely 
proportional to evidence and belief.  Second, I discuss my 
objection to an aspect of Inan’s claim that firm certainty and 
(high) interest yields no curiosity.  In ordinary enquiries or cases 
of propositional curiosity (e.g., whether questions), Inan’s claim 
that firm certainty extinguishes curiosity is convincing.  However, 
there can be objectual curiosity cases (e.g., what questions) 
where Inan’s claim may not be sufficient.  Moreover, in many 
academic enquiries, a scientist may remain motivated to expend 
extra epistemic and cognitive capital, despite his firm certainty 
about his once imaginable aspects of the object of curiosity, for 
the sake of unimaginable possibilities. Fueled by his continued 
curiosity, it is not uncommon for a scientist to take self-initiatives 
and reconsider propositions he was once certain about.  Based on 
his past experiences, he might have learned that certainty is 
generally impermanent and does not always last forever, which 
could keep his curiosity and hence the possibility of discovering 
more truths alive.  Third, I present a number of rebuttals to my 
objection and show how they fall short of supporting Inan’s 
account including the role of other feelings such as fear and 
anxiety about losing face, and knowing but being subjectively 
uncertain, which may motivate continued curiosity even when 
the agent is firmly certain. Fourth, I suggest an alternative view 
by adding open-mindedness to Inan’s curiosity formulation that 
could help exculpate my objection.  Instead of Inan’s 
proposition, I suggest that one can remain curious about an 
objective he is interested in, despite being certain about it, when 
he is open-minded.  (Baehr, 2012) Open-mindedness is a 
facilitating virtue and an activity that is a cognitive moving 
beyond or transcending of the person’s doxastic commitments, 
thus facilitating curiosity.  Open-mindedness assists in keeping 
the agent’s interest and uncertainty alive, and helps freeing the 
mind beyond default beliefs and binds of certainty. 
 




 Epistemologists have recently started to pay more 
attention to curiosity, its pertinence to intellectual traits, and 
how to examine the role of curiosity in the acquisition of 
knowledge.  Both psychology (Loewenstien, 1994) and 
philosophy (Inan, 2012) view curiosity as a basic motivator of 
knowledge. Psychological accounts of curiosity focus on its 
phenomenology and role in cognition.  Philosophical accounts 
of curiosity emphasize its epistemic achievements.  Epistemic 
curiosity addresses the connections between curiosity and 
epistemic inclinations and accomplishments; and it does so by 
examining the role of curiosity in appraising epistemic states 
and processes through such factors as uncertainty, interest, 
awareness of our ignorance, belief, evidence, acquaintance, 
and other elements standing between an agent and an object 
of his curious enquiry1.  
 The aim of this paper is to raise a challenge and offer a 
modification to rectify Ilhan Inan (2013) proposition that an 
agent’s curiosity ceases when the agent is interested and 
firmly certain about the object of his curious enquiry.  
Structure of the paper is as follows: 
First, I provide a brief argument construction pertaining to 
the relationship between uncertainty, interest, and curiosity 
posited by Inan (2013) in his “curiosity, belief, and 
acquaintance” essay.  This paper supports the overall premise 
of Inan’s position that an agent’s curiosity is directly 
proportional to both his interest and uncertainty about a 
proposition.  Inan posits that an agent can be uncertain about a 
proposition when he can suspend his belief about it, which 
motivates his curiosity2.  Additionally, he asserts that 
curiosity is inversely proportional to evidence and agent’s 
belief about a proposition.  Inan might have intended to 
suggest that if there were equal amount of evidence 
supporting and rejecting a proposition that compels an agent 
to suspend his belief, his curiosity would be at maximum.  
Inan (2010) adequately covers roles of belief, acquaintance, 
and osensibility in curiosity, which is outside the scope of this 
paper3.  
Second, I raise an objection to an aspect of Inan’s 
proposition that firm certainty and high interest yields no 
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curiosity. As noted earlier, Inan’s claim is clearly defensible 
in enquiries involving for example cases of propositional 
curiosity (e.g., whether color of microbe P is purple in ultra-
deep ocean?).  Consistent with Inan’s claim, such curiosity is 
extinguished when the scientist becomes certain (e.g., by 
discovering that the color of microbe P is in fact purple in 
ultra-deep oceans).   
However, there can be objectual curiosity cases (e.g., what 
is micro P’s life in ultra-deep oceans like?) where Inan’s 
claim may be deficient.  Moreover, there can be enquiries as 
in the academic field where a scientist has a mind-set that 
sustains his curiosity about propositions, even though he 
might have known it with certainty at some point in the past. 
A mind as such can be open to the idea of unthinkable 
possibilities, overshadowing the idea of a thinkable 
impossibility (i.e., it is impossible for a proposition that is 
now thought to be certain to be not so for ever).  Such a 
scientist could keep a mind-set that is open to the idea of the 
unimaginable (e.g., about life of microbe P in ultra-deep 
oceans).  He could be curious for its own sake and live a 
curious life as a matter of principle that transcends certainty, 
in part, because he feels joy in the process of being curious 
instead of its outcome (thereby transcending sought-for 
certainty about particular propositions).  
Third, I show how a number of rebuttals to my objection 
where factors other than curiosity may fuel a firmly certain 
agent’s enquiry, which fall short of curing Inan’s claim, 
including:  
 (i) an agent may pursue his enquiry despite being firmly 
certain due to feelings such as fear or anxiety of losing face 
and not due to curiosity,  
 (ii) interest OR uncertainty yielding curiosity instead of 
interest AND uncertainty, or 
  (iii) an agent can know the object of his curious enquiry 
with certainty but remain subjectively uncertain about it, 
which motivates his continued curiosity. 
Fourth, I suggest an alternative view that is congruent 
with the overall spirit of Inan’s claims about curiosity, by 
adding open-mindedness to his curiosity equation, which can 
help exculpate my objection to his claim.  Considering my 
supplemental formulation, one can remain curious about the 
object of enquiry which is of interest to him, despite having or 
having had firm certainty about it at some time, when he is 
open-minded.  Despite firm conviction, an open-minded 
person takes a curious initiative willingly, and gives serious 
consideration to the other side.  Open-mindedness is a (Baehr, 
2012) “facilitating virtue” and an activity that is a cognitive 
"moving beyond" or transcending of the person’s doxastic 
commitments, and thus facilitating deeper curiosity.  Open-
mindedness keeps the agent’s interest and uncertainty alive, 
and frees his mind beyond the particulars of belief - keeping it 
unimpeded from binds of certainty - by allowing the mind to 
remain detached from a default positions or standpoints. 
II. DISCUSSIONS 
A.  Supporting Inan’s Claim that the higher the Uncertainty 
and Interest, the higher the Curiosity 
 Certainty Factor:  Inan claims that curiosity about 
whether a proposition is true or false can only take place 
under uncertainty.  He suggests that the degree of uncertainty 
is directly proportional to the degree of curiosity.  Thus, if 
one’s belief is highly certain about the object of an enquiry, 
then curiosity is minimized.  Moreover, Inan points out that 
minimal evidence maximizes uncertainty, which yields 
greater curiosity about the object of an enquiry.  For instance, 
if you have a lottery ticket and you are certain that you will 
not win (e.g., one in a trillion chance of winning), you will 
likely not be curious, according to Inan.  But, if you have a 
lottery ticket with even a 0.01% chance of winning (99.99% 
chance of losing), you would be very curious4.  
Inan claims that curiosity is inversely proportional to 
belief, since belief is directly proportional to certainty5.  For 
Inan, being certain about a proposition corresponds to 
maximum strength of belief in that proposition.  He claims 
that strong subjective certainty prohibits curiosity, but implies 
that anything short of subjective certainty allows room for 
curiosity.  With curiosity being tied to evidence, Inan claims 
that S’s curiosity is at its highest, when there is no evidence 
that P or about P.  Moreover, Inan states that generally 
minimal evidence and soft belief yields soft subjective 
uncertainty, and hence stronger curiosity.  Most likely, Inan 
intends to posit that curiosity is maximal when (all else equal) 
there is an equal amount of evidence supporting P and 
contradicting P6 (Fairweather, 2012).  
Inan, thus far claims that if S is firmly certain that P or 
about P, then S will not be curious that P or about P.  The 
mirror image of his claim is that if S is highly uncertain that P 
or about P, then S will be highly curious that P or about P.  
Interest Factor:  Inan holds that if an agent is 
uninterested about an object of enquiry, then he will not be 
curious about it.  Accordingly, the degree of interest in the 
object of curiosity is directly proportional to his degree of 
curiosity7,8.  Inan contends that if an agent knows that it is 
highly improbable for a belief he holds (e.g. formed based on 
evidence or lack thereof) to be false, he may still be curious 
about it, depending on his interest.  Inan claims that an 
agent’s curiosity is maximized, even when there is minimal 
evidence, only when the agent has an interest in the object of 
the enquiry9,10.  
According to Inan, evidence impacts both belief and 
interest (and interest and belief are not independent attitudes), 
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which in turn motivate curiosity11,12.  All else equal, an agent 
is interested in or about an object of enquiry, manifested in 
part, via his degree of belief about it.   In Inan's view, just like 
the relationship between belief and curiosity, interest also 
comes in degrees:  the higher the interest, the more the 
curiosity.  
 Uncertainty and Interest Yielding Curiosity:  According 
to Inan, lack of certainty AND being interested in an object of 
enquiry motivates curiosity.  In other words, if S is interested 
in that P or about P, and uncertain that P or about P (S 
suspending belief that P or about P), then S can be curious 
that P or about P.  Hence, Inan’s claims that if S is firmly 
certain that P or about P, and even if S is highly interested that 
P or about P, then S will be not be curious that P or about P13. 
B. Objecting to an Aspect of Inan’s Claim that firm Certainty 
AND (even highest) Interest yields no Curiosity. 
 For more details regarding objectual (e.g. what is life in 
the ultra-deep ocean like?) and proportional (e.g. whether 
there is life in the ultra-deep ocean?) curiosity, readers can 
refer to Whitcomb’s (2010) paper.  
 Inan’s claim is valid for enquiries involving, for 
example, a propositional curiosity ceasing when uncertainty 
about such proposition is eliminated.  For example, once the 
answer to an enquiry such as “whether microbe P is purple in 
ultra-deep ocean” is discovered (i.e., that in fact microbe P is 
purple in ultra-deep ocean), then such curiosity is exhausted 
because uncertainty about it is extinguished. 
However, Inan claiming firm certainty and even 
maximal interest yielding no curiosity may be objectionable 
because it does not seem sufficient for either objectual 
curiosities or common (qualitative) scientific or academic 
enquiries.  
For example, it is not uncommon for a scientist to self-
initiate a reevaluation and reconsider his past certainty about 
some propositions. A Marine Biologist may be firmly certain 
about life in the ultra deep ocean (based on the evidence 
collected by Kaiko probe from the ultra-deep ocean). But also, 
he could still remain curious about life in ultra-deep ocean by 
being open to the re-examination of the same evidence, and 
follow reports or evidence offered by his peers (i.e. papers 
which might endorse or reject his conclusions or 
interpretations of Kaiko’s evidence).  Despite his certainty, 
the Marin Biologist could remain curious about life in ultra-
deep ocean for even the slightest possibility of finding or 
learning something new (albeit highly improbable).  He has 
this attitude towards curiosity, which transcends his idea 
about certainty, in part, because his field may be his passion, 
or perhaps because his investigative curiosity about life in 
ultra-deep ocean is a way of life for him. In such a light, it is 
not uncommon that a scientist’s curiosity and interest remains 
alive despite his firm certainty about all thinkable aspects of 
an enquiry at the time, which he had already contemplated 
and investigated. 
Due to their qualitative nature, there is a greater tendency 
in objectual curiosity enquiries to facilitate more room for 
curiosity to persist.  Framing enquires objectually, combined 
with an agent’s attitude towards curiosity could over shadow 
the idea of certainty and keep his curiosity alive.  Endurance 
of curiosity is not always necessarily about having firm 
certainty about one imagined aspect (i.e., part A) of an 
enquiry and being uncertain and hence curious about another 
imagined aspect (i.e., part B).   A scientist who is deeply 
interested about the object of his science, with an open mind, 
may maintain his curious attitude, despite having once 
attained firm certainty about all the thinkable aspects (i.e. part 
A and B) of the object of his enquiry.  This kind of open 
minded attitude may keep more space for more questions and 
more unimagined possibilities beyond what had been once 
imagined, asked, and answered.  
Being open to the possibility of the unimaginable may 
not necessarily be due to uncertainty about the object of 
curiosity. Such openness may stem from a scientist's personal 
trait which moves him above and beyond the particulars of 
objects of his curiosity, especially when risks-rewards or 
costs-benefits are not unfavorable in keeping the enquiry alive 
despite his certainty about it at the time.    For example, in the 
case of the Marin Biologist, he may take pleasure and may see 
little harm or trouble in (spending extra epistemic capital) 
attending an extra conference or reading an additional article 
about Kaiko’s findings.  
When the agent opens his mind, he may see that the idea 
of certainty about a proposition inculcated at the time may 
prove to be less important than other possibilities about the 
proposition that may await his re-discovery in the future, and 
this can sustain fueling his curiosity. 
Therefore, to rectify Inan’s claim, open-mindedness 
could augment his formulation together with firm certainty, 
and even the highest interest to yield curiosity, which is 
discussed in the fourth section of this paper.  
C.  Rebuttals to Additional Objections:  
  i.  Not Curiosity, but Other Feelings such as Anxiety and 
Fear Fueling Agent's Enquiry:  Inan could counter-argue that 
a scientist who is firmly certain about a proposition may 
continue pursuing his enquiry about a proposition due to 
anxiety or fear of losing face, and not for curiosity’s sake.  
Let’s consider the case that the Marine Biologist, with firm 
certainty about all thinkable aspects of life in the ultra-deep 
ocean, who has published or lectured the scientific 
community about his findings.  Inan could assert that the 
reason, such firmly certain scientist would continue his 
enquiries about life in the ultra-deep ocean, may be because 
he wants to maintain his reputation and defeat his contrarian 
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competitors, or he may be anxious about the slightest 
probability of being wrong and losing face, or that the 
security of his job requires him to defend his published work 
about life in ultra-deep oceans.  Thus, Inan might respond that 
the scientist, who is firmly certain, may be motivated to 
continue pursuing his enquiries for other feelings such as 
anxiety, fear, saving face, or desiring security, and not due to 
his curiosity. 
However, even an agent such as a scientist who is very 
uncertain about an object of his curiosity may have similar 
feelings (anxiety, fear, desiring security) that are operational 
before or during his enquiry, not only when he is firmly 
certain after his enquiry has been concluded.  
Additionally, there is no evidence to suggest that 
curiosity is independent of feelings such as anxiety or fear, 
but instead there are correlative studies that suggest that 
feelings such as fear may be interrelated with curiosity.  
(Lowenstein, 1994).  Necessity, triggering man's anxiety, fear, 
and desire for safety and security may have been the mother 
of many inventions in the survival phase of man’s evolution. 
Such feelings have worked hand-in-hand with curiosity and 
have as such become intertwined with curiosity.  Such 
feelings and curiosity have motivated man to pursue 
knowledge about new ammunitions, solutions, and tools, 
which in turn has helped him to build a world that has been 
becoming more cooperative.  In a cooperative world where 
man is less afraid, less worried, and less anxious about his 
survival or safety, curiosity would likely carry the greater 
force (despite being meshed with other fainter feelings such as 
worry, fear, and anxiety) in epistemic enquires that are of 
interest to him.  
  ii. Uncertainty OR Interest (Instead of Uncertainty AND 
Interest) Yielding Curiosity: Inan could modify his claim and 
respond that an agent would be curious if he is uncertain 
about the object of his inquiry OR the object of inquiry is of 
high interest to him.  Thus, the Marin Biologist who is firmly 
certainty, maintains his curiosity (not via uncertainty) but due 
to his high interest about life in ultra-deep oceans.  
 However, the problem with the OR arrangement arises in 
cases where object of inquiry is trivial: for example whether 
the total number of words in a book are odd or even.  Here, 
the object of inquiry is not of interest, where the agent can be 
(highly) uncertain whether the number of pages is odd or 
even, but he would not be curious whether the total number of 
words in a book are odd or even. 
  iii. Not Curiosity, but (Knowing and yet) being 
Subjectively Uncertain Motivating a (firmly Certain) Agent to 
continue his Curious Enquiry: Inan states that certainty 
corresponds to the maximum strength of a belief.  Once that 
maximum strength of belief is reached, curiosity becomes 
impossible14.  As indicated previously, Inan claims that 
curiosity is inversely propositional to the strength of one’s 
belief and that subjective certainty is incompatible with 
curiosity15.  In this light, Inan had implied that (Fairweather, 
2012) if S know that P or about P, but S’s belief is short of 
being subjectively certain that P or about P, then S might still 
be curious whether P or about P.  Thus, Inan could respond 
that although the Marine Biologist may know about many or 
all aspects of life in the ultra-deep ocean based on the 
evidence collected by the Kaiko probe, still the Marin 
Biologist can remain curious because his subjective certainty 
(belief) about different aspects of life in ultra-deep ocean can 
fall short of firm certainty.  
However, relying on subjectivity takes the philosophical 
(epistemic) enquiry in a more psychological path.  It opens 
the door to the idea that justification does not or may not 
require certainty with the extreme case being dogmatic 
certainty.  Subjective uncertainty or certainty, including 
dogma, may stand incompatible with knowing, which is a 
topic beyond the scope of this paper.  Therefore, if subjective 
uncertainty were a form of open mindedness, then such aspect 
of subjective uncertainty may work here.  Having said that, 
open mindedness may be a more suitable trait for 
epistemology compared to subjective uncertainty, which is an 
unidentifiable subjective motive that could unconsciously or 
at best sub-consciously compels a curious agent to doubt or 
second-guess himself and help enliven his curiosity.  
III. CONCLUSION 
The Higher the Interest, Uncertainty, and Open-Mindedness, 
the Greater the Curiosity, Instead of Inan’s View that the 
Higher the Interest and Uncertainty, (only then) the Greater 
the Curiosity 
 The consequence of Inan claim is that one’s curiosity 
ceases when he has become certain about his object of 
interest.  I object to Inan’s claim because, while his 
proposition may cover ordinary enquiries such as 
propositional curiosity, that is not broad enough.  My 
objection utilized examples in cases of objectual curiosity and 
scientific enquiries where it is possible for an agent to remain 
curious about an object he is interested in, because his 
approach towards curiosity may be more qualitative or he may 
have a curious attitude beyond the point of being defined or 
extinguished with certainty.  My alternative view restores 
Inan’s curiosity claim, and it is not a radical departure from 
his core perspective regarding the role of uncertainty and 
interest, but instead it entails a modification to his formulation 
by including open-mindedness to his curiosity equation. 
Hence, all things being equal, I suggest that one can be 
certain about his object of interest, and still remain curious 
about it when one is open-minded. 
For example, let's contemplate on a case of a Detective 
Holmes who could remain curious about other evidence that 
may present itself about Smith’s murderer, despite Holmes 
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having concluded that Ralf murdered Smith.  Holmes could 
remain curious because he is open-minded, which could stem 
from his attitude about truth overriding the operations of his 
certainty.  Holmes, being open minded, could likely 
contribute to more good than harm in expending additional 
detective capital such as taking an extra phone call, 
conducting an extra interview, or contemplating any 
additional (previously unimagined) possibilities contrary to 
his original findings.  Additionally, open-mindedness may be 
an implicit norm of his profession.  Detectives may have a 
duty to be practical about closure and concluding a murder 
case by relying on evidence against Ralf that is beyond a 
shadow of doubt.  Yet, their employer may grant them the 
discretion to leave the door open for the remote possibility of 
any new or contradictory evidence and suspects – albeit 
improbable.  Note that even before Holmes becomes certain 
about Ralf, his open-mindedness can facilitate his curiosity by 
enabling Holmes to suspend his judgment and certainty by 
considering (have interest in) all evidence for or against any 
suspect, including Ralf.  Thus, open-mindedness facilitates, 
and neither hinders the operation of uncertainty nor works to 
diminish Holmes interest in the course of his curious enquiry. 
As noted in an earlier example, a Marine Biologist 
remains curious about life in ultra-deep ocean, despite being 
certain about all that was once the thinkable aspects of life in 
ultra-deep oceans because he is open-minded.  A Marine 
Biologist remains curious because his curious attitude about 
pursuing truth could keep his imagination open to unimagined 
possibilities, which dominates and overrides his certainty 
about a particular life in ultra-deep oceans.  Similar to the 
detective case, open-mindedness for the Marine Biologist 
keeps him interested, with his curiosity persisting.  
To make the role of open-mindedness in curious inquiries 
more clear, some background and framing of this trait may be 
helpful.  The quality of open-mindedness that makes it an 
intellectual virtue is widely covered in the current literature16.  
Some distinctive features of open-mindedness are generally 
relevant to situations involving intellectual conflict such as a 
person’s belief on one hand and opposing argument and body 
of evidence on the other (Roberts, 2007).  Nonetheless, open-
mindedness can be manifested in situations void of 
intellectual dispute and can be present in intellectual activities 
other than rational evaluations (Baehr, 2011, p196). 
Open-mindedness is closely related to virtues such as 
intellectual fairness, honesty, impartiality, empathy, patience, 
adaptability, creativity, and autonomy17. A curious agent 
understands the risk and disadvantages of being closed-
minded, which could fuel his inclinations towards open-
mindedness.  An agent may have learned that being closed-
minded would generally prevent a person to “conceive of or 
imagine certain otherwise inscrutable or unidentifiable 
possibilities or explanations in his enquiries” (p198)18.  In this 
light, a truth-seeking agent who is generally biased against 
closed-mindedness remains willing to expend some extra 
amount of epistemic and cognitive capital, despite the 
certainty about the object of his curiosity.  An open-minded 
person does not ignore or distort new or opposing positions.  
"In the context of intellectual conflict or opposition, open-
mindedness is an antidote to vices such as narrow 
mindedness, closed-mindedness, dogmatism, prejudice, and 
bias"(p195).  While he may have many firm convictions, “his 
hold on them does not prevent him from giving serious 
consideration to the other side" (Roberts, 2007).  In order for 
an agent to remain curious, "taking seriously an alternative 
cognitive standpoint” requires first the freedom or departure 
from chains of his own beliefs and cognitive conclusions.  In 
each case that a person departs or detaches from a certain 
default or privileged cognitive standpoint, he or she moves 
beyond or transcends it (Baehr, 2011, p198). 
An open-minded person is one who is able to, even if 
need be temporarily, loosen his grip on his belief or certainty 
that P in order to consider or take seriously the case for not-P, 
not due to some subjective or unconscious uncertainty about 
P, but due in part to  desire for truth that transcends particular 
truths.  Intuitively, it is this cognitive ‘moving beyond’ or 
transcending of the person’s doxastic commitments, and a 
willingness to consider things from the other side, that makes 
the activity in question an instance of open-mindedness (pp. 
198-199).  
Open-mindedness is often a “facilitating virtue” that 
equips the curious agent to think outside the box not just 
about this P, but about all the P's that he has not yet imagined 
or met.  It allows the curious dialog to keep going.  By freeing 
the mind beyond the particulars of belief, or keeping it free 
from the binds of certainty, it creates psychological space, as 
it were, for other virtues and faculties to perform their 
respective functions.  Also, note that the kinds of open-
mindedness, in the context of curiosity, is about things that 
are genuine objects of interest or entail having something at 
stake that demands taking such a standpoint "seriously": the 
real intention of being open-minded is “not just for show” but 
it requires giving that object of interest a fair, honest, and 
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END NOTES 
                                                          
1 Socrates:  The only thing he knew was that he knew nothing.  This 
awareness of ignorance is much more than just acknowledging that there are 
some things you do not know. The Socratic Teacher knows that his ignorance 
touches every thought he has and every fact he knows. 
2 A brief summary of propositional versus objectual curiosity is provided 
here by way of an example offered by Fairweather (2012).  Being curious 
whether Ralf is Smith’s murderer is propositional curiosity, and it is 
generally a direct question (we can also say we desire to know or get a true 
belief about the truth of Ralf murder of Smith).  But if we are curious about 
who murdered Smith, there is no propositional object of curiosity, and it is 
generally an indirect question (involving an objectual curiosity). Inan and 
Whitcomb both agree that objectual curiosity requires acquaintance.  Also 
they agree that the degree of belief may not be as relevant to objectual 
curiosity since there is no propositional attitude.  Inan refers to a distinction 
between beliefs where some beliefs are de dicto (concerning the dictum, the 
thing said or the proposition) and others are de re (concerning the thing). 
Object of de dicto belief are (generally direct and) propositional, versus the 
object of de re belief is a person or a thing, and not a proposition, and (are 
generally indirect) objectual. Inan borrows this same concept from belief 
systems, applies it to curiosity, and refers to Whitcomb (2010) who argues 
that generally curiosity cannot be (de re and de dicto) propositional attitude.  
Whitcomb argues that propositions are generally not the content of curiosity, 
but rather questions are (and Inan neither explicitly disagrees nor agrees with 
Whitcomb on this matter). 
3 This is similar to Sellar’s concept of “ostensible seeing” that brings agent’s 
conceptual (experiential) representations that are concepts formed in the 
agent’s imagination about for example the value and success of the object of 
curious enquiry. Moreover, acquaintance and interest are not mutually 
exclusive in relation to an object of curiosity, go hand-in-hand, and are 
directly proportional with each other.  
4 The example of lottery ticket may not do justice for curiosity since other 
feelings such as greed, addiction to gambling, desperation (looking for a 
miracle) could be the dominant (emotional) motivators as opposed to 
curiosity. 
5 Inan implies that certainty can be viewed in the “subjective” sense.  He 
notes that people who hold dogmatically false beliefs are paradigm cases. 
Also, Inan seem agreeable that one can even be curious about something he 
or she knows, as long as that piece of knowledge is fallible and thus not 
certain (in the subjective sense). Although an utterance such as “I know that 
the world population is greater than 7 billion, but I am not certain that this is 
the case and I am still curious whether it is so” does seem somewhat odd, it 
may very well express a truth. Given that this would appear to be a 
controversial issue, Inan does not pursue it here since his focus starts and 
ends in how curiosity relates to belief. (Fairweather, 2012). 
6 For example, Holms  (investigating a murder) suspects S1 and S2 to be 
possible murderers (although Holmes knows that such belief about S1 and S2 
are highly improbable because there is no evidence) and he remains curious 
who the murderer is (say Holmes curiosity degree is at 0.5). Subsequently, 
Holmes finds evidence that Ralf might be the murderer (say curiosity degree 
goes higher than 0.5).  All else are not equal before and after the evidence 
pointing to Ralf.  When there was no evidence against Ralf, Holmes was 
curious who the murderer was, but not curious whether Ralf was the one or 
not.   
7 Curiosity needs to have something at stake (of utility or value or 
importance) that makes the object of curiosity of interest to the agent. 
Generally speaking, curiosity does not chases truths that are (easy because we 
perceive easy as) unimportant or of no value. Society rewards finders, 
creators, and makers – who produce, which is a potential aftermath of 
curiosity.  Therefore, normative aspect of what is importance and which is of 
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value play into curiosity in assessing what is worth pursing and what is not. 
The normative aspect of curiosity is an important subject but beyond the 
scope of this paper. 
8 Example of uninteresting truths are trivial propositions such as the number 
of words in a book being odd or even, which don’t make a difference to a 
curious agent. 
9 What locks-in our curiosity starts with our detection of a gap (uncertainty) 
between what we know/believe and imagine/sense and this gap needs to be 
wide enough to make us imagine that there could be something of value 
worth pursuing.  Research by Forkman (1996) suggests that we seem to be 
somewhat coded to look for what is not obvious because we assign a higher 
priority to it (because it triggers our curiosity) compared to what is obvious.  
10 We imagine easy truths, as fruitless or as trivialities that others –situated 
similarly- have found or not have bothered to pursue. Thus, generally, object 
of curiosity needs to be non-trivial in relations with the interest and skills of 
the curious agent. Also, note that in Holmes example, the detective’s skills 
and non-triviality of evidence are not necessarily mutually exclusive factors 
and would influence curiosity.   
11 Example:  S buys a lottery ticket.  If his odds were 1 in a million to win the 
lottery, he will likely be somewhat curious about the outcome.  However, 
when S finds evidence that suggest his odds have increased to 1 in 100, then 
S’s belief about wining and interest would amplify. Thus, S becomes more 
curious. 
12 Inan claims that curiosity will be inversely proportional to belief and 
directly proportional to the interest. Additionally, Inan suggests that there are 
objects that we have firm beliefs or opinions about, but have no interest in 
them. Interest and belief are not independent attitudes. “Interest interacts with 
belief in its own peculiar way, and without further inquiry into this interaction 
we may not jump to any conclusion” (Inan, 2012) 
13 In a lottery ticket example, applying Inan’s claim yields that if S knows 
(based on facts) the his odds to win the lottery were 1 in a trillion, he will not 
be curious about the outcome.  S’s interest in lottery can remain very high 
given the potential rewards of millions of dollars.  However, S’s certainty 
about not winning (given the extremely low odds) causes his curiosity to 
cease.   
14 This belief may or may not be true or normative, but it is intended here to 
describes the agent’s mental state. 
15 Case of dogmatic belief is for example when an ancient was certain that the 
world was flat, then he could not have been curious about whether this was or 
was not the case. 
16 Montmarquet (1993), Kvanvig (1992), and Roberts and Wood (2007) 
17 Readers can refer to Baehr’s (2011) paper regarding the “structure of open-
mindedness” that explains such relationships and addresses whether open-
mindedness is a disposition (of the will or involving a reliable ability or 
capacity) to exercise intellectual excellence.   
18 We pursue our curiosity through engaging in exploration because we feel 
good when we imagine the potential benefits and not necessarily the real 
benefits.  Our imagination (Brand, 2009) about the possible impact and utility 
of our enquiry servers our focus and attention from which we drive pleasure.  
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